Security Aspects

Data Integrity
Prevent unauthorized change.

Data Availability
Legit users can get the data.

Data Confidentiality Non-legit users can't.

Privacy
Sender or client is anonymous.

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Security Policy

Network Security

Chapters 26, 40

Inadequate: Make it secure.

Must define the goals.

What sort of access must be permitted?

What sort of access must be prevented?

Applies both to networks and hosts.

Who Done It?

Accountability
Who added or accessed that datum?

Authorization
Who said that person could add or access that datum?

Control Access to machines and data must be controlled.

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Encryption

Symmetrical Encryption M = decrypt(K, encrypt(K, M))


Difficult to transmit K.

Public Key Encryption $M = decrypt(K_{pri}, encrypt(K_{pub}, M))$ $M = decrypt(K_{pub}, encrypt(K_{pri}, M))$ $K_{pub} \neq K_{pri}$

Safe to transmit K_{pub} .

Secure Socket Layer

SSL adds a layer between socket and the higher-level protocol. $Such \ as \ HTTP.$



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Digital Signatures

Message MSignature $S = encrypt(K_{pri}, M)$

Only holder of K_{pri} can produce $\langle M, S \rangle$ Verify that M = decrupt(S).

Alternative signature: $S = encrypt(K_{pri}, digest(M))$ Verify that digest(M) = decrypt(S).

Second version produces a smaller signature.

SSL Handshake

SSL must begin by establishing a secure link before sending user data.

Symmetric encryption is not secure. $Must\ share\ a\ key.$

Public key encryption is slow.

Use public-key encryption to send a symmetric key.

The conversation proceeds using symmetric encryption on this key.

SSL Handshake

Each side sends some randomly-generated data to the other.

The server sends a certificate containing its public key to the client.

The client generates a secret which it sends to the server using its public key.

Both sides use the same secret to produce the same session key.

Optionally, the server may authenticate the client. Client sends a certificate and signed message.

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Certificates

A message signed by a trusted third party. $Certificate\ Authority.$

Contains:

Server's public key Server's domain name Issuer's domain name Issuer's signature

Clients contain a list of CA's and their public keys.

If signature can be verified, the CA vouches for the server's identity.

If a CA's private key leaks, it's all over.

Firewalls


SSL Services

HTTPS

SSH

SFTP

A monitored gateway, really.



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Firewall Properties

All traffic entering or leaving passes through.


Rejects traffic outside the security policy.

Cannot be attacked.

Best to run no other services on it.

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Packet Filters



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Packet Filters

Examine each packet.

Rules determine if we like this packet.

If we don't it's gone.

Rules primarily examine the source and destination host and port.

For instance:

Discard HTTP packets going to machines not the web server.

Discard packets from fred.edu.

Discard packets from outside claiming to be from inside.

Packet Filter Types

Stateless

Examine each packet in isolation.

Stateful

Remember previous packets.

Handles Connections Better.

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Network Address Translation

Multiple interfaces

Like any router

Rewrites packets passing through.

Change source outbound; change destination inbound

Represents internal hosts with its own local port numbers.

Internal hosts see only the external host.

External hosts see only the outside of the NAT router.

Multiple internal addresses can use one external address.

Multiple local addresses become multiple port numbers.

Proxy Servers

Clients connect to the proxy.

Proxy connects to the external host.

The proxy generally forwards traffic. Blocks and alters as required.

Proxies understand user-level protocols. $HTTP,\ FTP,\ etc.$


Client is aware of the proxy.

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
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NAT Routers



Proxies



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Transparent Proxies


Proxies of which the client is not aware.

Clients connect to the external host, but the gateway modifies the traffic.

Normal proxies operate without changing the operation of TCP or IP.

Transparent proxies need the IP layer to send them packets addressed elsewhere.

A Hardened Gateway




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Transparent Proxies



Breaking In

Goals

Run commands.

Run privileged commands.

Means

Hijack a server.

Log in and hijack some local program. Perhaps steal a password.

Fool someone into running the commands for you.

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Passwords

Talk someone out of one.

Find one written down.

Snoop the net.

Guess.

Some web servers make this easy.

Trojans

Trick a legit user into running the code for you.

Email viruses are a form of this.

A trojan can start a surreptitious server. $Back\ orifice.$

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Buggy Servers

Provide services they are not s'posed to.

Buffer overflow

Temp file problems

Known bugs get posted on hacker sites.

Port scanning. nmap

Firewall Security

Prevent outside access to services.

Running deliberately or not.

Prevent outside access to servers run by idiots. $Deployed\ thoughtfully\ or\ not.$ $Usually\ not.$


Allow a concentration of attention on one machine. Easier to secure one server than all the desktops.

Prevent a hacker from learning about the network.


Port scans don't go past the firewall.

Virtual Private Network

Use public Internet as a private link.



Virtual Private Network Encoding




Tunneling

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Virtual Private Network



Sources

 $\begin{array}{c} \text{Comer, } \textit{Computer Networks and Internets} \\ \textit{(Our beloved textbook.)} \end{array}$

http://www.pseudonym.org/ssl/ssl_intro.html

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